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Preserving Work in the Face of Technological Change: NLRB v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association' — The advent of containerized shipping
brought major technological change to the ocean freight industry. 2 Prior to this
development, ship cargo was loaded and unloaded piecemeal by long-
shoremen. 3 A shipping company now can load and unload a ship which has its
cargo consolidated into containers, 4 then transfer the unopened container to
rail or truck transportation.' It is also possible for the shipper to provide con-
tainers to businesses which load them away from the pier. 6 The result is an
enormous increase in dockside cargo handling efficiency.' Containerization,
however, also threatened the job security of longshoremen.' This threat to the
stability of their jobs led the longshoremen to begin a lengthy strike against
their employers at several eastern ports in the late 1960's. 9 The agreement
which the parties negotiated to end the strike included provisions on the
handling of containers. l° In NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Association, the
United States Supreme Court examined the validity of a revised version of
those provisions," which represented an attempt to resolve the problem of job
stability during technological change through collective bargaining.
International Longshoremen involved two unfair labor practice actions, aris-
ing in the New York and Virginia-Maryland areas. ' 2 In both the New York
and Virginia-Maryland cases, members of the International Longshoremen's
Association (ILA) worked under collectively bargained agreements which in-
cluded nearly identical provisions, entitled Rules on Containers (Rules)." Ac-
cording to these Rules, if a container owned or leased by a compa,:y employing
447 U.S. 490 (1980).
Id. at 494, 496.
3 Id. at 495.
• Id.
▪ Id. at 494-95.
6 Id. at 495-96.
' See id. at 494-95.
a Id. at 495.
9 The strike occurred in 1968. Brief for Respondents at 8, NLRB v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490 (1980), reprinted in 13 LAW REPRINTS, LABOR LAW SERIES
NO. 11 at 262 (1979/1980). It lasted 57 days in New York and up to 100 days in other ports. Id.
10 International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
11 447 U.S. at 498-99.
" Two New York freight forwarders and two trucking companies from Baltimore and
Hampton Roads, Virginia brought separate actions before the National Labor Relations Board.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d at 898. The NLRB proceedings arc
reported in International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 236 N.L1R.B. 525, 98 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1978)
(New York), International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 231 N.L.R.B. 351, 96 L.R.R.M. 1636
(1977) (Baltimore and Hampton Roads). The International Longshoremen's Association and the
Council of North Atlantic Shipping Associations (CONASA) were named as opposing parties in
both actions. Id. CONASA was a regional bargaining association which represented local
longshoremen's employer groups in negotiations with the International Longshoremen's
Association (ILA). 447 U.S. at 496 n.10. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia considered appeals of the NLRB decisions together, because of their similarity. See 613
F.2d at 891 n.3.
613 F.2d at 893 & n.17.
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ILA members was to be unloaded within fifty miles of the pier, by persons
other than those working for the beneficial owners of the cargo, the employer
was required to permit its longshoremen to do the unloading on the pier."
Similarly, if a container owned or leased by the employer of the ILA was to be
loaded within fifty miles of the pier, by persons other than those working for the
cargo's beneficial owners, the ILA employer was required to permit its
longshoremen to do, or re-do, the loading on the pier. 13
 The agreements
obligated the longshoremen's employers to pay $1,000 to the ILA in liquidated
damages for each container handled in violation of the Rules. 1
€ The practical
effect of the Rules was that 80 percent of all containers passed over the docks
intact, while longshoremen loaded or unloaded the other 20 percent regardless
of whether that work duplicated work done or to be done away from the pier.' 7
Certain inland freight businesses, perceiving that the Rules were de-
priving them of some of their usual work, brought the unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings which led to International Longshoremen. 18
 The freight businesses had
either loaded or unloaded containers supplied by the employers of the
longshoremen within fifty miles of the pier.' 9 In consequence, the employers
were found liable under the Rules' provision that ILA members were allowed
to reload or unload such containers. 20 After being assessed for the liquidated
damages, the employers stopped using the inland freight businesses involved: 2 '
As a result, the inland freight businesses initiated unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) against
both the union and its employers. 22
The freight businesses alleged that the agreement containing the Rules on
Containers violated sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (Act or NLRA). 23
 Section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits those union activities
with the object of forcing one employer to stop doing business with another
14
 447 U.S. at 498. See Rule 1 of the 1974 Rules on Containers, in NLRB v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. at 514-15 app.
13 447 U.S. at 498. See Rule 1 of the 1974 Rules on Containers in NLRB v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. at 514-15 app.
16 447 U.S. at 498.
' 7 Id. at 499. This practical effect of the Rules was due to the numerous exceptions to
their general requirements. The most obvious reason for such a large percentage of containers
passing over the docks without being opened by longshoremen was the fifty mile limit set forth in
Rule 1. See text and notes at notes 14-15 supra for a description of Rule 1 and the limit. Rule 2
was devoted to a lengthy list of other containers which the longshoremen would allow to pass in-
tact over the docks, including those containing a single manufacturer's goods, those containing
household effects, and those containing the personal effects of military personnel. See Rule 2 of
the 1974 Rules on Containers, 447 U.S. at 516-17 app.
11
 613 F.2d at 898.
447 U.S. at 500-01.
2° 613 F.2d at 899-900. See text and notes at notes 14-16 supra for a description of the
applicable Rules provisions.
21
 447 U.S. at 500-01.
22 Id. at 501-02.
23
 613 F.2d at 900-01. These provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are
codified at 29 U.S.C. $ 158(b)(4)(B) and 5 158(e) (1976).
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employer, unless the purpose of the activity is "primary. "24 Section 8(e) pro-
hibits collectively bargained agreements in which an employer agrees to stop
doing business with any person." Thus the gist of the freight businesses' alle-
gations was that the ILA, by imposing the contractual sanctions, had coerced
its employers to stop doing business with the freight businesses." This prac-
tice was allegedly forbidden by section 8(b)(4)(B). 27 Similarly, the employers,
by becoming obligated under the Rules, effectively had agreed to stop doing
business with freight businesses operating within the fifty mile radius." Section
8(e), the freight businesses argued, prohibited employers and unions from
making this type of agreement. 29 The ILA and its employers responded to
these allegations by contending that sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) were not ap-
plicable to the contract clauses or to their enforcement because each came
under the exception for a "primary strike or primary picketing." 3° The extent
of this exception became the major issue in these two unfair labor practice ac-
tions.
24 447 U.S. at 503 & n.19. The pertinent part of 5 8(b)(4)(B) provides that it is an un-
fair labor practice for a labor organization:
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, proc-
ess, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where ... an
object thereof is —
I	 I	 *
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ... Provider', that
nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing; . . .
29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
" 447 U.S. at 503-04. The pertinent part of 5 8(e) is as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other per-
son, and any contract or agreement entered heretofore or hereafter containing
such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void, . . .
29 U.S.C. S 158(e) (1976). Although 5 8(e) does not explicitly mention agreements with a
primary purpose, courts consistently have found that the section applies only to agreements with
secondary objectives. 447 U.S. at 504.
26 Brief for Petitioner at 30, NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S.
490 (1980), reprinted in 13 LAW REPRINTS, LABOR LAW SERIES NO. 11 at 68 (1979/1980).
" Id.
28 Id. at 25.
29 Id.
3° Brief for Respondents at 33, NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447
U.S. 490 (1980), reprinted in 13 LAW REPRINTS, LABOR LAW SERIES No. 11 at 287 (1979/1980).
See Brief for Respondent at 21, NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 447 U.S. 490
(1980), reprinted in 13 LAW REPRINTS, LABOR LAW SERIES NO. 11 at 217 (1979/1980). The excep-
tion is set out in 5 8(b)(4)(B) explicitly and implied in 5 8(e). See notes 24-25 supra for the texts of
the two sections and an explanation of 5 8(e).
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The labeling of certain influential activities of labor organizations as
"primary" and others as "secondary" has a long history." The Supreme
Court has established that union conduct is secondary, and therefore pro-
scribed by section 8(b)(4)(B), if one of its objects is to affect the conduct of an
employer other than the struck employer." This improper object could be
achieved by forcing the struck employer to cease doing business with another
employer." Where the union's sole object is to influence the struck employer,
however, there is usually no unfair labor practice," even if its actions have an
incidental effect on businesses with whom the employer has dealt." In Interna-
tional Longshoremen, the struck employers were the companies employing the
longshoremen. The other employers were the freight businesses with whom the
struck employers had ceased dealing. Whereas section 8(b)(4)(B) applies to
union conduct, section 8(e) applies to the contract between the union and its
employer. 36
 Determination of whether a union's objective in a contract provi-
sion is primary, however, is the same under both provisions. The objective is
illegal under section 8(e) if one of its objects is to affect the conduct of an
employer other than the contracting employer." Of special importance in
determining whether the actions of the union and its employers in International
Longshoremen violated sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) was the Supreme Court's ar-
ticulation of the "work preservation" concept, in an earlier decision, National
Woodwork Manufacturers Association r. NLRB." In that case, the Court held that
when employees acted against their employer with the object of preserving
work which they traditionally had done, they were not acting with the second-
ary objective of affecting a different employer." Thus the objective of work
preservation was deemed to be primary and therefore not proscribed by sec-
tions 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). 40
31
 See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620-33 (1967), which
reviews this history at length in its discussion of the development of 5 8(b)(4)(B).
32
 NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 529 n.16 (1977).
33 Id. at 530 n.I7
34 Id. at 529 n.16.
" Id. In the context of union picketing against neutral businesses which deal in the
struck employer's product, the Supreme Court has held that the otherwise legal picketing is a
violation of 5 8(b)(4)(B) if its effect would be to ruin the neutral business. NLRB v. Retail Store
Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980). The Court reasoned that if the effect of the
picketing was to force neutral businesses to choose between survival or ending their business rela-
tionship with the struck employer, then the union must have such coercion as an objective. Id. An
objective to coerce neutrals, the Court noted, is illegal under § 8(b)(4)(B). Id.
36 See text and note at note 25 supra for the text of § 8(e).
37
 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 635 (1967). The Court
held that § 8(e) was merely a measure to close the loophole which would allow a union to avoid
the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4)(B) via a contract provision (rather than a strike) requiring an
employer to stop business with a third party to whom the union objected. See id. at 634.
" 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
39 Id. at 644-46. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had already applied this
concept in its decision in Meat and Highway Drivers Local 710 v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C.
Cir. 1964). In that case, Judge Wright upheld Union efforts to regain city delivery routes which it
had lost when meat packing companies moved out of Chicago to outlying areas and changed their
method of delivery. Id. at 714. The court found that the drivers were simply "recapturing" the
routes which they had driven before the change, Id,
'° See 386 U.S. at 644-46.
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When it considered the cases brought by the freight businesses in International
Longshoremen, the NLRB based its analysis on the work preservation concept,
finding that the traditional work of longshoremen did not include the work of
employees of the freight businesses." This finding led the Board to conclude
that the Rules had no valid work preservation objective and therefore that they
violated sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). 42 On appeal, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the NLRB ruling,'" holding that the
scope of valid work preservation agreements was broader than the Board had
determined."
The Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for certiorari. 45 In a five-
to-four decision," the Court held that to define the work in controversy in a
work preservation dispute without focusing on the work of the bargaining unit
employees47 is an error of law under the work preservation doctrine." It
remanded the case for the Board to reconsider whether the Rules have a lawful
work preservation objective, using a proper understanding of the work preser-
vation doctrine." International Longshoremen's significance lies not in its narrow
holding, but rather in the Court's assertion that the work preservation doc-
trine5° extends to employees who seek to preserve work which is not identical to
their traditional work. 5 ' This assertion is in direct conflict with the Board's
prior view that there could be no valid work preservation purpose unless the
very work claimed had once been performed by those claiming it." As a result
of this change in the work preservation doctrine, the relatively simple task of
determining whether employees had ever done the jobs which they were claim-
ing has been replaced by a subjective examination of the relationship between
the work performed before the innovation and the work to be preserved."
41 236 N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York); 231 N.L.R.B. at 364-65
(Baltimore and Hampton Roads) (decision of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)).
" 236 N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277, 1278 (New York). 231 N.L.R.B. at 365
(Baltimore and Hampton Roads) (decision of ALJ).
" International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
44 Id. at 908-09.
" 444 U.S. 1042 (1980). The decision to grant certiorari was in response to a conflict
between the courts of appeal. 447 U.S. at 493. Compare International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
Local 1575 v. NLRB, 560 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1977); Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 548 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977) and International Longshoremen's Ass' n v. NLRB (Conex),
537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976) with International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
" 447 U.S. at 522. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and
Stevens, wrote in dissent. Id. at 522. Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 492.
" 447 U.S. at 507.
49 Id. at 511 n.26, 512
49 Id. at 511-12
5° See text and notes at notes 38-40 supra for a discussion of the work preservation doc-
trine.
5 ' 447 U.S. at 506.
52 See 231 N.L.R.B. at 364, 365 (in other work preservation cases, employees once had
performed the work which they claimed); International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 221 N.L.R.B.
956, 960, 90 L.R.R.M. 1655, 1659 (work preservation cases distinguishable because employees
in those cases previously had done work sought).
33 447 U.S. at 507.
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This casenote will examine the Supreme Court's use of the work preserva-
tion concept in determining whether a union's activities or agreements aimed
at maintaining employment during technological change are within the
"primary" exceptions to sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act. 54
 National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB and other
representative work preservation cases that preceded International Longshoremen
will be examined to establish the context in which the principal case was de-
cided. Next, the casenote will describe the opinions of the three bodies that con-
sidered International Longshoremen: the NLRB, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, and the United States Supreme Court. The discussion
will illustrate how differently these decisions approached work preservation
analysis. Finally, the Supreme Court's reasoning in International Longshoremen
will be analyzed. It will be submitted that the Court's attempt to stop the
NLRB and certain circuit courts from applying sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) too
stringently may be thwarted by its reliance on the work preservation concept
rather than on a more complete consideration of the primary-secondary
dichotomy underlying work preservation. The casenote will conclude with a
proposal for a more complete and effective analysis based mainly on the
primary-secondary concept, rather than on the work preservation theory.
I. THE WORK PRESERVATION DOCTRINE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL,
LONGSHOREMEN: NATIONAL WOODWORK AND CONEX
The International Longshoremen Court relied on two prior Supreme Court
decisions in making its basic assumption that work preservation was a
lawful primary objective. 55 The earlier of the two cases, National Woodwork
Manufacturers Association v. NLRB, 56 was the one from which the Court quoted
in setting forth the general rule on how to determine whether an agreement is
lawful work preservation, 57 and was the seminal Supreme Court decision on
work preservation. International Longshoremen's Association v. NLRB (Conex),"
decided by the Second Circuit, was the leading federal appeals court case ap-
plying the work preservation doctrine to the Rules on Containers at the time
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided International
Longshoremen. 59 The decisions of both the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Supreme Court in International Longshoremen are to some extent a reaction to
Conex. The next two sections describe the National Woodwork and Conex opinions
and discuss their relevance to the International Longshoremen decisions.
54 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
55 447 U.S. at 504. The cases were National Woodwork and NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of
Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
56 National Woodwork was decided in 1967, while NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefit-
ters was decided in 1977. See notes 54-55 supra.
57 See 447 U.S. at 504.
58 537 F, 2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976).
59
 See note 45 supra for a listing of the relevant circuit court cases.
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A. National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB
In National Woodwork, Frouge, a general contractor, employed members of
a carpenters' union under a collective bargaining contract 6° which stated that
union members would not handle doors which had been fitted prior to being
furnished on the job. 6 ' The term "fitted" referred to the tasks of preparing a
door for knob, hinges, and hanging. 62
 Traditionally, carpenters employed on
the jobsite had performed these jobs," but it was possible to buy pre-fitted
doors from the manufacturer." When the general contractor purchased the
pre-fabricated type of door, the carpenters refused to hang them. 65
 The general
contractor therefore removed the doors and substituted blank doors, which the
carpenters prepared, as usual."
The manufacturer of the doors was a member of the National Woodwork
Manufacturers Association, 67 and that organization filed unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB concerning the events described above." The charges
alleged, inter alia, that the contract's "will not handle" provision violated sec-
tion 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 69 which prohibited any agree-
ment whereby an employer agreed to stop doing business with another
employer." The charges also claimed that the union's enforcement of the pro-
vision violated the requirement of section 8(b)(4)(B)" that a union not force
any person to cease using the products of another manufacturer. 72
In its consideration of the section 8(b)(4)(B) issue, the Supreme Court
held that the section barred union activity directed against a neutral employer,
6° 386 U.S. at 615.
Id. & n.2.
62 Id. at 615.
" Id. at 615-16.
" Id. at 616.
65 Id.
" Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See note 25 supra for the relevant text of 5 8(e).
7° 386 U.S. at 616.
71 See note 24 supra for the relevant text of 8(b)(4)(B).
72 386 U.S. at 616. The Board found for the carpenters on both the contract's "will not
handle" provision and the enforcement of that provision. United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners, 149 N.L.R.B. 646, 657-58 (1964) (decision of Trial Examiner). The opinion stated that
the "will not handle" provision did not concern employers with whom the general contractor had
done business. Id. at 657. Rather, it served the legitimate economic interest of preserving unit
work. Id. The Trial Examiner concluded that the provision had the lawful objective of work
preservation and therefore was not prohibited by $ 8(e), Id. He reached the same conclusion with
regard to actions to enforce the agreement against Frouge, which had allegedly violated
8(b)(4)(B). Id. at 657-58.
The Seventh Circuit reversed that decision only as to the $ 8(c) claim. National Wood-
work Mfrs. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 1966). In a confusing opinion, the court found
5 8(e) controlling in the case, id. at 599, apparently because 5 8(e) had no provision allowing
primary activity, but prohibited only any agreement to boycott a product. See id. at 597-98. This
interpretation of the lower court's meaning was also how the Supreme Court read the decision.
See 386 U.S. at 618.
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even if the immediate employer was the neutral party, when the activity
directed against him was carried on for its effect elsewhere!' In the Court's
view, the section did not, however, bar the incidental effects of primary activi-
ty. 74
 On the section 8(e) issue, which concerned the contract itself rather than
the act of enforcing it, the Court held that section 8(e) was a loophole-closing
measure applicable to the same conduct as section 8(b)(4)(B). 75
 It therefore did
not prohibit employees' agreements requiring their employers to preserve for
themselves work which they had done traditionally. 76
To support its holding with respect to section 8(b)(4)(B), the Court looked
to the history of congressional action on the issue of labor's use of the boycott to
involve an employer in disputes not his own." It considered the Clayton Act,"
and found that such "secondary" pressures had not been exempted from an-
titrust laws." The Court pointed out that the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
constituted a complete change from the Clayton prohibition of secondary ac-
tivity by unions. 8° Norris-LaGuardia allowed union activity without regard to
whether it was primary or secondary." According to the Court, however, labor
abuses of this freedom to involve neutral parties in its disputes led to a prohibi-
tion of secondary activities in the Taft-Hartley Act, in the forerunner to section
8(b)(4)(B). 82
 The Court reviewed the extensive legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act83 to support its conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit
primary activity." The Court noted that union efforts to preserve its members'
jobs usually were considered primary activity." It went on to state, however,
that it was not deciding how Congress might have viewed workers who carried
on a boycott in order to acquire new job tasks when their own jobs were not
threatened by the boycotted product." Only as a final note to its discussion of
section 8(b)(4)(B) did the Court point out that Congress later had added a
specific proviso making the section inapplicable to primary activity." A review
of the equally extensive legislative history of section 8(e) 88
 supported the
Court's conclusion that that provision had the same scope as section
8(b)(4)(B). 89
 Thus, just as section 8(b)(4)(B) did not prohibit employee actions
73 Id. at 632.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 635.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 620.
78 Id. at 621.
79 Id. at 622.
80 Id.
et Id. at 622-23.
82 Id. at 623.
83 See id. at 622-32.
84 Id. at 632.
85 Id. at 630.
86 Id. at 630-31.
B7 Id. at 632. See note 24 supra for the relevant text of 8(b)(4)(B).
88 Id. at 635-44.
89 Id. at 635.
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with the purpose of preserving their traditional work, the Court found that sec-
tion 8(e) did not prohibit agreements made for the same purpose."
Having determined that preservation of traditional work was an estab-
lished primary objective," the Court stated the narrow issue of the case as
whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the objective of the
carpenters' boycott and contract was to preserve work, or was to further union
objectives elsewhere. 92
 The Court emphasized that in making this determina-
tion, "Nile touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is ad-
dressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own
employees." 93
 The Court then quickly concluded that the carpenters' sole ob-
jective was work preservation." Thus, it affirmed the circuit court's decision
that the activities of the carpenters did not violate section 8(b)(4)(B) and re-
versed the circuit court's decision that the carpenters' contract violated section
8(e). 95
National Woodwork appeared to find that the key factor in a primary-
secondary analysis was determining whether the union's actions or its contract
related solely to the immediate employer-employee relationship. Indeed, the
National Woodwork Court considered this determination to be the "touchstone"
of any such analysis. 96
 Similarly, in its discussion of an earlier case as an exam-
ple of secondary activity, the Court emphasized that the employees had no
work preservation or other primary objective pertaining to their relations with
their employers." Thus, the National Woodwork Court did not view work
preservation as the only way for a union to prove its objectives were primary. It
was unclear, however, to what extent a union could claim that its objective of
work preservation was a primary one. The Court merely stated that work
preservation was traditionally a primary activity, 98
 without commenting on the
limits to this assertion. The facts of the case offered no real guidance on the
limits of work preservation as a primary objective, since the carpenters in Na-
tional Woodwork were seeking to do work in a form precisely the same as that
which they had always done. 99
9° Id.
91 Id. at 630.
92 Id. at 644.
93 Id. at 645.
94 Id. at 646.
9' Id.
96 See id. at 645.
97 Id. at 629.
98 Id. at 630.
99 447 U.S. at 505; 386 U.S. at 615-16.
Subsequent cases in the federal courts of appeal did not clarify the limits of the work
preservation doctrine. In one of the first cases to consider the problem after National Woodwork,
the Eighth Circuit upheld an agreement in which plumbers agreed to install only boilers which
had not been pre-fabricated, because the pre-fabrication eliminated some of their traditional
tasks. American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1968). See general-
ly Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1978) (clause preserving
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B. International Longshoremen's Association u. NLRB (Conex)
The limits of National Woodwork's endorsement of work preservation as a
primary objective were explored by three circuit court opinions dealing with
the same Rules on Containers at issue in International Longshoremen.'" The
earliest of those cases, International Longshoremen's Association v. NLRB (Conex), 101
was cited with approval by the two later cases. 102 The International Longshoremen
Court discussed specifically'" the Conex ruling that it was an illegal secondary
objective for a union to seek work traditionally done by employees whom it did
not represent.'"
The Conex facts were almost identical to those in International Longshoremen.
The ILA had assessed damages against two of its employers for their violations
of the Rules on Containers.'" In consequence, the employers stopped supply-
ing empty containers to certain freight businesses'" who, it appears, were
operating within fifty miles of the pier. As in International Longshoremen, the
freight businesses filed an unfair labor practice action, 1 ° 7 charging that the
Rules on Containers violated section 8(e) of the Act,'" and that their enforce-
ment violated section 8(b)(4)(B). 1 "
The Conex court found that the ILA's Rules on Containers could be met
only if the work traditionally performed off-pier by employees outside the ILA
carpenters' work on modular homes not challenged by plaintiffs); Local 636, United Ass'n of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 906 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (agreement preserving certain work for employees on the job not challenged by
Board). A recent case, also decided by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals did address the
issue of a bargaining unit seeking work that was not identical to work it had done in the past.
Local 742, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 683, 690
(D.C. Cir. 1976). The union had refused to install pre-machined plastic-clad doors unless paid a
premium. Id. at 689. It claimed that the preparation of such doors was work which carpenters did
at the jobsite. Id. at 688. The Board found no evidence that the carpenters traditionally had
worked on any plastic-clad doors, and therefore held that the union's demand for a premium if it
installed pre-machined plastic-clad doors was not work preservation. Id. at 689. The court
disputed the Board's finding that no evidence supported the union's claim that the work was
traditional. Id. They did not pursue this point, however. Instead they found that the door itself
was unimportant as long as the work done to prepare it was the same as that traditionally per-
formed by the carpenters. Id. at 690. The court recognized that distinguishing between a wood
door and a wood door sheathed in plastic, see id. n.11, was too fine a line. The court observed,
"feimployee rights would be lost whenever new advances in technology or industry practice
altered the nature of a product but not the type of work required to install it." Id. at 690. See
Comment, Work Recapture Agreements and Secondary Boycotts: ILA v. NLRB (Consolidated Express,
Inc.), 90 HARV. L. REV, 815, 823 & n.44 (1977).
115° See cases listed at note 45 supra.
101 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976).
102 See International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1575 v. NLRB, 560 F.2d at 445;
Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 548 F.2d at 499.
"3 447 U.S. at 502.
104 537 F.2d at 711.
1 ° 5 Id. at 710.
106
	
at 711.
1 ° 7 Id.
108 Id.
1 " Id.
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was taken over and performed at the pier by ILA members.' '° Pursuant to this
finding, the court held that the Rules on Containers had an illegal secondary
objective under sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). 11A The Conex court ruled that if a
union's objective was to seek work to which union members were entitled, then
that objective would be held to be primary." 2 If the union's objective was to
obtain work traditionally done by other employees not represented by the ILA,
however, that objective would be held to be secondary."'
The court's holding in Conex focused on the work which the union
employees sought. It was therefore essential, the court found, to define the
work in controversy precisely, in order to evaluate the union's claim to it.' 14
The traditional work of the ILA was found by the court to include loading and
unloading containers on piers. 15 In contrast, the court noted that the tradi-
tional work of freight businesses included loading and unloading containers off
the pier." 5
 In view of these two findings, the court also found that the work of
loading and unloading the containers in controversy was within the traditional
work of the freight businesses.'" Further, it was clear to the court that the in-
cidental loading and unloading of containers on the pier, which the
longshoremen could claim as their traditional work," 8 did not embrace the
loading and unloading of containers off the pier." 9
 In light of the court's
holding that a union objective to obtain work traditionally done only by other
employees was secondary, 120
 the implied conclusion of Conex was that the Rules
on Containers had a secondary objective because they sought work traditional-
ly done by other employees, but never done by longshoremen.
A key aspect of the Conex opinion was its assertion that, to have a primary
objective, a union could seek only to preserve work to which it was entitled. 121
The opinion implied that if a union could claim that it traditionally had per-
formed the work in controversy, then it would be entitled to seek the work as a
primary objective, even if other groups also traditionally had done the same
work. This implied rule explains why the opinion was careful not only to show
that the work in controversy was traditional for employees of the freight
businesses, 122
 but also to assert that the work did not fall within the ILA's tradi-
tional role, as the court had defined it.'" The practical result of this approach
"° Id. at 712.
"' Id. at 711.
112 Id.
113
114 Id.
Id. at 711-12.
16 Id. at 712.
" 7 Id.
118 Id.
"9 Id.
120
 Id. at 711.
" 1 Id,
"2
 Id. at 712.
123 Id
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would be to prevent a union from claiming a primary work preservation objec-
tive unless it was seeking work which it actually had done before. This result
occurs because a union contract or activity, with a purpose to obtain work
somewhat different from that traditionally performed by union members,
would be challenged if it affected other people already doing the work. In such
a case, the challengers could assert tradition, while the union seeking to secure
its jobs would have to admit that it had not previously performed the exact
tasks sought. Under Conex, a union would never be entitled to preserve work in
any way different from the traditional work of its members. The very restrictive
view of work preservation adopted by the Conex court represented the position
of all the circuit courts which had considered the containerization issue up to
the time the NLRB began its consideration of the cases which were to become
International Longshoremen. 124
II. NLRB v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIA770N
The decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in International
Longshoremen reversed the Conex trend by not finding the Rules on Containers
violative of section 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e).'" The Supreme Court found
similarly.'" Neither court, however, held that the rules were legal. Rather,
they criticized the restrictive analysis of Conex and the NLRB, recommended a
better approach, and remanded.' 27 This section will discuss briefly the Board
decisions in the two cases which led to International Longshoremen and then
describe the opinions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in some detail. The appeals court opinion presents ideas on
work preservation which are useful in understanding the Supreme Court opin-
ion and which may be of continued importance in this still-developing area.
The ensuing description of the Supreme Court opinion will set out the most
current authority on the work preservation doctrine, and will be followed by an
analysis of the current status of that doctrine.
The Board's decisions in the two actions that comprised International
Longshoremen were, in reasoning and result, identical to the Conex decision
described above.'" The NLRB found that the ILA's actions and the Rules
which those actions sought to enforce were illegal under sections 8(b)(4)(B) and
8(e), unless they fit within the primary exceptions to those sections.'" The
Board analyzed the Rules and the ILA's actions exclusively in terms of work
preservation.'" It found that the longshoremen historically had not done the
129 See cases listed at note 45 supra.
125 613 F.2d at 914.
12° 447 U.S. at 512.
' 27 Id.; 613 F.2d at 914.
12° See text and notes at notes 101-24 supra for a discussion of the Conex opinion.
In 231 N.L.R.B. at 364 (decision of ALA) (Baltimore and Hampton Roads). See 236
N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York).
' 30 236 NL.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York); 231 N.L.R.B. at 364-66
(Baltimore and Hampton Roads).
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work in question.' 3 ' Since the ILA members could not assert that they had
once performed the work of loading and unloading containers picked up by the
freight businesses, the Board found that the Rules did not seek to preserve
traditional work. 132 Unable to label the Rules "work preservation," the NLRB
concluded that the rules violated sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(0 33 because they
did not have a primary purpose.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
NLRB could not, under the work preservation doctrine, ignore the traditional
work patterns of longshoremen when defining the work in controversy, unless
the new work was so unrelated to the old that it was a clear break with the
past.' 34
 The court vacated and remanded both NLRB rulings for new pro-
ceedings consistent with the court's interpretation of the law.'"
The court also used the concept of work preservation. Its application of
that idea, however, was considerably broader than that of the Second Circuit in
Conex or that of the NLRB in its two rulings below.
Judge Wright, writing for the majority, first observed that agreements in
which employees sought to preserve work threatened by technological advances
were not considered illegal under the proscription against secondary boycotts
contained in the NLRB. 136
 He went on to state the issue of the case at hand as
whether the Rules and their enforcement were used to acquire work tradi-
tionally done by the freight businesses rather than to preserve work for
longshoremen.'" He found that the first step in the "acquisition" versus
"preservation" determination was to define the "work in controversy."'"
This process of definition, in turn, had to consider all surrounding cir-
cumstances.'" In the circumstance of a technological innovation, Judge
Wright found that the definition must take particular account of pre-
innovation work patterns, since the key problem in applying the work preser-
vation doctrine is rationalizing the innovation into traditional work patterns.H°
The NLRB erred, according to the court, because its definition of the work in
controversy as loading and unloading of containers away from the pier' 4 ' was
cast solely in terms of the work created by the innovation. 142 Judge Wright
found that such a definition made it impossible for those who worked before the
236 N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. 1277 (New York); 231 N.L.R.B. at 353, 96
L.R.R.M. at 1637-38 (decision of Board) (Baltimore and Hampton Roads).
"2
 236 N.L.R.B, at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York); 231 N.L.R.B. at 365
(decision ofALJ) (Baltimore and Hampton Roads).
'" 236 N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York). See 1231 N.L.R.B. at 365
(Baltimore and Hampton Roads).
13 ' International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d at 908, 910.
'" Id. at 910, 914.
'" Id. at 903.
'" Id. at 908.
'" Id.
13' Id. at 909.
'" Id. at 909, 910.
'+' Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
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innovation to relate the new work to their traditional work patterns.' 43 The
NLRB's approach would be appropriate, according to Judge Wright, only if
the innovation created work unrelated to past work patterns.'"
The appeals court opinion left the actual definition of the work in con-
troversy to the NLRB. 145 It did not give specific guidance on how to rationalize
the new work into traditional work patterns, except to state, as a possible
definition of the work in controversy, "{title loading and unloading of ocean-
borne cargo, with its directly related peripheral tasks such as sorting
cargo. . . .'" 46 Because the NLRB had determined that the Rules were illegal
based on an erroneous definition of the work in controversy, the court re-
manded for the Rules to be considered using a correct method of definition. 147
Judge Wright, in his International Longshoremen opinion, made an implicit
assumption when he declared the crucial question in work preservation cases to
be how best to rationalize the work after the innovation into traditional work
patterns.' 48 He assumed that work preservation remained a primary objective,
within the meaning of sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e), even when employees
demanded jobs that could not be reconciled into traditional work patterns
without some rationalizing effort. This view stood in sharp contrast to the view
of the Cortex court, which was unwilling to accord the objective of work preser-
vation primary status except where the work sought to be preserved was iden-
tical to the work performed before the technological innovation.' 49 Judge
Wright's rationalization approach looked for similarity between the traditional
work and the work sought. The Conex court was unwilling to rationalize; it
demanded that the traditional work and the work sought be identical.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals."' The Court held that the Board's
definition of the work in controversy was an eror of law under the work preser-
vation doctrine"' because it did not focus on the work of the bargaining unit
' 43 Id.
' 44 Id. at 910.
'" Id.
"6 Id.
1 " 613 F.2d at 910, 914. The Supreme Court's opinion in International Longshormen ad-
dressed almost exclusively the problem of defining the work which the longshoremen wanted. See
447 U.S. at 505-09. Judge Wright, however, discussed four issues related to the work preserva-
tion doctrine, in addition to defining the work in controversy. 613 F.2d at 905. First, he deter-
mined that, on the facts of the case, the Rules were not calculated to achieve union objectives
elsewhere. Id. at 911-12. He next found that the NLRB had not relied on the theory that a work
preservation agreement does not itself immunize what is otherwise secondary activity, so he did
not consider that issue. Id. at 912. The third issue which judge Wright discussed was the right to
control test. Id. He stated that an employer had to be able to control the disposition of the work
which employees sought, in order for the employees' activity to be primary. Id. He found that the
employers of the longshoremen did have such control. Id. at 912-13. Finally, under the heading
"substantial evidence standard," Judge Wright observed that the issue at hand was not factual
findings, but legal interpretation. Id. at 913.
i48 Id. at 909.
149 See text and notes at notes 121-24 supra for a discussion of the Conex rule.
' 5° 447 U.S. at 512.
447 U.S. at 511 n.26, 512.
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employees.'" The majority opinion, written by Justice Marshall,'" began its
analysis by focusing upon section 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the NLRA.' 54 It
described the two statutory provisions as limited to forbidding only secondary
activity.' 55
 Having thus briefly set out the applicability of sections 8(b)(4)(B)
and 8(e), Justice Marshall moved directly to a discussion of work preservation
as one of the primary purposes protected by those provisions.'" He supported
this statement by reference to two earlier Supreme Court cases, 157 National
Woodwork and NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Pipefi tiers.'" These cases, accord-
ing to the majority, established a two-part test for determining whether a union
work preservation agreement is lawful: (1) the agreement must seek to preserve
the employees' traditional work, and (2) the employer must be able to grant the
jobs requested. 159
Turning to the first part of this test, the Court found the central issue in
the work preservation analysis to be the identification of the work which the
agreement seeks to preserve.'" It found that issue to have been obvious in Na-
tional Woodwork, because in that case the carpenters were demanding the same
jobs that they had always performed. 161 The majority went on, however, to
find that the congressional intent to protect actions and agreements with the
object of work preservation went beyond the National Woodwork fact pattern, to
include actions and agreements seeking to preserve work in a form different
from that of the employees' old tasks, while maintaining many of their work
patterns.' 62
 After making this observation, the Court held that the Board's ap-
proach to defining the work at issue in International Longshoremen was incorrect as
a matter of law.'" Endorsing Judge Wright's opinion below, the Court ob-
served that the Board's focus on the work as done after the innovation
prevented longshoremen from negotiating any agreement which allowed them
to work on containers.'"
The opinion also set out the proper method of identifying the work in con-
troversy in the context of a complex case of technological displacement.' 65
 The
Court found that the "surrounding circumstances" language of National Wood-
work' 66
 required that the identification of the work at issue take into account the
152 Id. at 507.
153 Id. at 493.
154 Id. at 503.
155 Id. at 504.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
159 447 U.S. at 504.
160 Id. at 505.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 505-06.
163 Id. at 506-07.
164 Id. at 508.
165 Id, at 507.
166 Id.
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nature of the work both before and after the innovation.I 67 Furthermore, in a
case like International Longshoremen, where there were several interrelated types
of work,'" the Court asserted that the Board must focus on the traditional work
of the union employees seeking to preserve work, not on the work of other
employees doing the same or similar work.' 69 The Court then left the problem
of defining the work and went on to explain that the work preservation
analysis, after identification of the historic work of the union and of the work in
controversy, will require an evaluation of the relationship between the two
types of work.'" The determination of whether an agreement seeks to preserve
only the traditional work of bargaining unit members will depend on how well
the agreement achieves the objective of preserving "the essence of traditional
work patterns. " 171 The Court further stated that in determining whether the
Rules represented a lawful attempt to preserve traditional longshore work, the
Board should be informed by an awareness of the congressional preference for
collective bargaining as a method for resolving problems due to technological
dislocation of work.'" The Court noted, also, that an agreement's validity
depended on its legality, not its rationality and efficiency.'" This was the ex-
tent of the Court's discussion of the first prong of its two-part test — whether
an agreement has preservation of traditional work as it objective. 174
The Court did not examine the second prong of its test — whether the
employer was able to grant the jobs which the union sought.'" Because of the
parties' erroneous conception of the work in controversy, the Court found that
any consideration of the issue of the right to control that work would be
premature. 176 The Court also declined to consider allegations that con-
tainerization had eliminated entirely the longshoremen's former work,'" or
that it was illegal for the longshoremen's employers to withhold containers on
the basis of the Rules. 178 Thus, it remanded the case to the Board solely on the
grounds of the Board's erroneous definition of the work in controversy.'"
Three justices joined Chief justice Burger in his dissenting opinion, which
also focused on the work preservation concept.' 8° The dissent found that the
different functions of containers required different methods of defining the
work being sought, depending on what use was being made of the
167 Id.
168 Id.
163 Id.
170 Id.
"' Id. at n.24.
12 Id. at 511.
"3 Id.
174 Id. at 504.
175 Id. at 504, 511-12.
16 Id. at 512.
"7 Id. at 510-11.
1 " Id. at 512.
In Id.
189 Id. at 522, 525 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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containers. 1 e' Containers, according to the dissent, sometimes functioned like
a ship's hold, but at other times were like the trailer of a truck. 182 Thus, the dis-
sent found that the work in controversy had two definitions: the loading and
unloading of ships, and the loading and unloading of trucks. 183 Without further
explanation, the dissent then agreed with the Board's determination that the
work which the disputed provisions of the Rules sought to control was the work
of loading and unloading land-based transportation.'"
Having accepted the Board's definition of the work at issue,'" the dissent
then discussed the merits of the case and found that there was substantial
evidence to support the Board's decision that the Rules on Containers and
their enforcement violated sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B).'" Since the
longshoremen had never before worked on the containers mentioned in the
Rules, the dissent reasoned, they were perverting the work preservation doc-
trine by reaching out for work. 187 The dissent expressed fear that work preser-
vation would swallow sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e).' 88 Apparrently in reaction
to the majority's assertion that there was a congressional preference for collec-
tive bargaining as the method for resolving disputes over dislocation of workers
by technological change,'" the dissent rejected the possibility that the Rules
could be an acceptable collectively bargained compromise.' 8° Justice Burger
noted that the mere fact that an agreement was bargained collectively did not
exempt it from the prohibitions of sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). 19 ' The dissent
was unwilling to accept an agreement which gave the union work that had
never been performed by longshoremen.'"
Work preservation was the central theme of the analysis of International
Longshoremen by the NLRB,'" the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,'"
and both the majorityl" and dissenting' 88 Supreme Court opinions. The ap-
plication of the work preservation doctrine in these opinions broke down into
" I
 Id. at 522-23.
"2 Id. at 523.
1" Id. at 525.
la+ Id.
1 " Id.
J06 Id. at 529.
'" Id. at 526.
188 Id.
"9 ' See id. at 511.
188 Id. at 528-29.
" I Id. at 529.
"2 Id. at 525.
I88
 236 N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York); 231 N.L.R.B. at 364-66
(decision of ALJ) (Baltimore and Hampton Roads).
14 613 F.2d at 892.
'" 447 U.S. at 493.
196 Id. at 522, 525 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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two basic approaches. The Board and the Supreme Court dissenters simply
determined the traditional work of the union claiming certain work and the
traditional work of the workers who would be affected by the claim.'" If the
claiming union could not show that it traditionally had done precisely the same
work as that already performed by the others, there could be no valid work
preservation objective.' 98
 The circuit court and the Supreme Court majority
opinion took a more complex view of the doctrine. Rather than simply deter-
mining the traditional work of those affected by the union's claim and compar-
ing it to the union's traditional work, these opinions set out a more general
method for defining "work in controversy." This definition focused on the
traditional work of the claiming union.' 99
 The analysis then called for an effort
to rationalize the work thus defined into the claiming union's traditional
work. 20° Both methods of analysis are apparently original. Nowhere in National
Woodwork did the Court attempt to describe how to determine whether a
union's objective is work preservation.
III. THE RATIONALE OF INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN
A. Weaknesses in the Supreme Court's Use of the Work Preservation Doctrine
The Supreme Court in International Longshoremen concluded that the Rules
on Containers were not clearly illegal based on its perception of the work
preservation doctrine. Questions arise, however, concerning the usefulness of
the Court's method for determining whether a union's objective is work preser-
vation, and its minimal effort to relate its decision to the primary-secondary ra-
tionale of sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). 201 This section will show that the
Court's recommended method for determining whether a work preservation
objective exists is so vague as to be nearly impossible to enforce. It will also
describe how the Court has almost completely lost sight of the concept that a
primary objective is any objective which relates to a dispute between an
employer and his immediate employees.
A major problem with the International Longshoremen opinion concerns the
practical application of the Court's view of work preservation by the Board.
The Court held that the Board had erred in defining the work in controversy by
failing to focus on the longshoremen's traditional work. 202 The appropriate
method of definition, according to the Court, was for the Board to define the
work sought in terms of the bargaining unit employees, not the work of others
197
 447 U.S. at 524-25; 236 N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York); 231
N.L.R.B. at 365 (Baltimore and Hampton Roads).
"8
 447 U.S. at 525-26; 236 N.L.R.B. at 526, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1277 (New York); 231
N.L.R.B. at 365 (Baltimore and Hampton Roads).
199
 447 U.S. at 507; 613 F.2d at 909.
2" 447 U.S. at 507, 509; 613 F.2d at 909.
20i See 447 U.S. at 504-05.
2G2
	 U.S. at 507, 511 n.26, 512.
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doing similar jobs."' The Court further ruled that the agreement's or action's
legality would then turn on the historical and functional relationship between
the old work and the new work. 2°4 It is questionable, however, whether the
Court's method of definition and analysis would prevent the evil at which it
was aimed: the Board's foreclosure of any possibility of longshoremen
negotiating an agreement which would permit them to do some loading and
unloading of containers."' Buttressing the Court's holding was only a vague
policy in favor of work preservation, 206 and the Court admitted that the Board
was free to determine how to apply this policy. 207 Thus, International
Longshoremen leaves the NLRB with the option of taking the longshoremen's
traditional work into account when defining the work sought, 208 while still
claiming that it is impossible to rationalize the work sought with the
longshoremen's traditional work patterns. 2 D 9 Since, according to the Court, the
legality of agreements alleged to have work preservation as their objective turns
on the determination of whether traditional work patterns can be rationalized
with work sought, 21 ° the Board could invalidate the contract. A court reviewing
such NLRB decisions would find no error in the Board's application of the
work preservation doctrine because, under International Longshoremen, the initial
determination of the relationship between the traditional work and the work
sought is left completely to the NLRB. 2 " Thus, nothing in the International
Longshoremen opinion would prevent the NLRB from continuing to enforce the
narrow view that employees may seek to preserve only jobs identical to those
traditionally done.
Another problem with the majority opinion was its failure to explain clear-
ly how its discussion of the work preservation doctrine related to the primary-
secondary distinction made by sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the Act. 212 The
Court relied upon a perceived congressional policy in favor of work preserva-
tion as justification for extending National Woodwork to the facts presented in In-
ternational Longshoremen. 213
 It never considered how its extension of work preser-
vation affected the problem of whether the longshoremen had been motivated
by interests solely within their relationship with their employers. Yet the ques-
tion of what interests motivated the bargaining unit is the basic issue in deter-
2 ° 3 See id. at 507.
204 id
205 See id. at 508.
2 ° 6 See id. at 506. See also text and note at note 162 supra for a description of the Court's
discussion of the work preservation policy.
2" 447 U.S, at 511.
2" See id at 507.
209
 See id. at 510 & n.24.
210 Id. at 510.
21 See id .
212 See text and notes at notes 31-37 supra for a description of the primary-secondary
distinction made in §§ 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e).
2 " See text and note at note 162 supra for a description of the Court's discussion of con-
gressional policy and work preservation.
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mining whether a union's contract or activity was primary under sections 8(e)
and 8(b)(4)(B), according to National Woodwork. 2 "
In summary, the Court in International Longshoremen set forth a complex
method of defining the work in controversy and comparing it to traditional
work. It is questionable, however, whether that complex method will achieve
the Court's purpose to make work preservation a more broad and flexible doc-
trine than it was in the Board's decisions, because of the great discretion which
the Board has in rationalizing work sought with traditional work. In addition,
the Court did not attempt to relate its test for the legality of work preservation
agreements to the primary-secondary distinction used in section 8(b)(4)(B) and
8(e) of the Act. These problems could have been avoided to a great extent if the
Court had looked to National Woodwork to fashion a different method of
analysis, focusing on the union's objectives.
B. An Alternative Approach
Instead of the present approach taken in International Longshoremen, the
Court could have required the test for the legality of a union contract or its en-
forcement to be an application of the National Woodwork "touchstone" stand-
ard. 215
 Under that test, a union's agreement, or its enforcement is not second-
ary, and therefore not in violation of sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B), if it is ad-
dressed only to the labor relations of the employees vis-a-vis the contracting
employer, rather than to furthering union objectives elsewhere. 216 The test
would find that the ILA in International Longshoremen has objectives elsewhere if
there is evidence to prove that the union's purpose in negotiating and enforcing
the Rules was to use its immediate employers to pressure the inland freight
companies to hire ILA members, or allow the ILA to represent freight com-
pany employees. Absent such evidence of an outside objective, the agreement
or action would be legal. If it is shown that the work sought does not relate
closely to the traditional work of union members, that showing would be rele-
vant under the proposed test only as circumstantial evidence that the union has
an objective to influence an employer whose employees do the work sought, in
addition to any legal objective to influence the union's immediate employer. As
described below, this test would have achieved the Court's goal of allowing
employees threatened with displacement by technological advances to demand
jobs somewhat different from those which they traditionally had done. 217 At the
same time, this test effectively would eliminate the two major problems in-
"4 See 386 U.S. at 645. See also 429 U.S. at 529 n.16.
715.
 The touchstone standard is set out in 386 U.S. at 644-45. See text and note at note 93
supra.
2L6 See text and notes at notes 92 and 93 supra for a description of the touchstone stand-
ard in National Woodwork.
217 447 U.S. at 506.
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herent in the majority opinion: creating a practical method of analysis, and
relating its decision to the primary-secondary rationale of sections 8(b)(4)(B)
and 8(e).
The use of this touchstone test would have allowed a well reasoned exten-
sion of National Woodwork to the facts of International Longshoremen. In National
Woodwork the Court ruled that an objective to preserve work was legal unless
there was an objective elsewhere. 218 In the latter case, the union's objective
would be secondary and therefore illega1. 219 The proposed tests focuses similar-
ly on the union's objective. The National Woodwork Court stated its touchstone
test as follows: "Nile touchstone is whether the agreement is addressed to the
labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees. " 220 It
is apparent that the Supreme Court's major concern in National Woodwork was
to determine the union's objective in its actions and agreements. Work preser-
vation was therefore not important in and of itself, but only because it was not
an objective designed to further union interests outside the immediate relation-
ship between contracting parties. Thus, National Woodwork stood for the prop-
osition that the doctrine of work preservation was only one way to determine
whether the purpose of a union agreement was primary.
In addition to being supported by the language of National Woodwork, the
touchstone test would have been more practical to apply than the Court's work
preservation analysis in International Longshoremen. The touchstone test involves
the relatively straightforward factual determination of whether a union's con-
tract or its actions were designed to accomplish goals beyond the immediate
employer-employee relationship. This determination would constitute a find-
ing of fact, which courts are directed by statute to review under the substantial
evidence standard."' The relative ease with which the touchstone test can
be applied was demonstrated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
which had little trouble in finding that the Rules on Containers were not in-
tended to achieve some secondary ILA goal,'" such as organizing the
employees of the inland freight businesses. In International Longshoremen's
Association, Local 1575 v. NLRB, 223 another of the circuit court cases involving
the Rules on Containers, 2 " there was undisputed evidence that the union had
pressured the freight businesses to hire its members. 225 The court noted that
this evidence would allow the Board to easily conclude that the union had an il-
legal objective to organize the freight businesses. 226 In sharp contrast to
386 U.S. at 644,
219 Id. at 645.
"" Id. (footnote omitted).
"' See 29 U.S.C. 5 160(e), (1) (1976).
222 613 F.2d at 912.
"3 560 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1977).
224 See note 45 supra for a list of the other circuit court cases on the Rules on Containers.
225 560 F.2d at 445.
226 Id.
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evaluating evidence that the union has some outside objective is the process, re-
quired in International Longshoremen, of judging the relationship of two types of
work. 227
 This vague concept gives no guide to the NLRB, or to a reviewing
court, as to the limits of Board discretion. 228
Requiring the Board to focus on the union's objective in seeking to
preserve work, rather than on the relationship between the traditional and the
work sought, also would accord with section 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). Those sec-
tions both recognize that unions may legally engage in activities or contracts
which have a primary objective. 229
 The essence of the definition of primary is
whether the purpose of the union activity or contract relates only to the
employer-employee relationship."° In contrast, the International Longshoremen
opinion gives the Board broad discretion on an issue — the relationship be-
tween old and new work — which began merely as an analytical tool for deter-
mining whether a primary objective existed. By making the resolution of this
issue dispositive, the Court has enabled the Board to find illegal a union activi-
ty or contract which has absolutely no secondary motive under the touchstone
definition. Thus, the Court has replaced the statutory test of primary motive
with a test of its own making, based on the relationship of the work sought to
the work done in the past. 23 '
The proposed alternative would not require the court to reject its view that
some relationship between the work sought and work previously done is rele-
vant to the legality of the union's actions. Rather, the new test would consider
the relationship between old and new work as circumstantial evidence of the
union's objectives vis-a-vis its immediate employer. A longshoremen's union
might negotiate a contract which required its employer to hire and train
longshoremen to repair damaged containers, instead of sending them to a
welding contractor. The lack of any relationship between the traditional work
of longshoremen and welding implies that the contract provision had an objec-
tive of using the longshoremen's immediate employer to aid the
longshoremen's union in efforts to have welding contractors hire its members.
This is a dispute outside the immediate relationship of the longshoremen and
their employers; therefore, the evidence that the work sought is unlike the
traditional work tends to show that the contract provision is illegal. In the case
of welding versus longshoremen's work, such evidence might be dispositive.
When the distinction between old and new work is more subtle, however, as in
the International Longshoremen situation, such circumstantial evidence appears
weak. The weakness is in the attempt to find that the ILA had an objective to
2" See 447 U.S. at 507, 509.
228 See text and notes at notes 170-73 supra for a description of the Court's analysis based
on the relationship of two types of work.
229
 See text and notes at notes 31-37 supra for a discussion of the primary-secondary
distinction in $S 8(b)(4)(13) and 8(e).
235
 See text and notes at notes 31-35 supra for a discussion of the definition of
"primary."
231
 447 U.S. at 507.
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force the inland freight businesses to hire its members based only on a contract
provision designed to protect a limited share of the work lost to containeriza-
tion. To make a reasonable case under the proposed test, further evidence
would be required. Such evidence could be testimony by employees of the in-
land freight businesses that the ILA had recently attempted to organize them,
or had attempted to replace their existing union. By requiring this type of
evidence, rather than looking only to a subjective determination of how similar
two types of work are, the new test goes to the heart of the primary-secondary
issue under sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e): whether the union had some objective
elsewhere when it negotiated the contract, or took the action, in question. 232
CONCLUSION
In NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Association the Supreme Court
found that the work preservation doctrine should be applied by defining the
work at issue in terms •of the traditional work of the employees seeking new
work, and then determining how well the two types of work relate to each
other. The Court gave no real directions to the NLRB, however, on how this
comparison of types of work should be made. Thus, the NLRB retains great
discretion in determining how sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) should be applied.
The extent of this discretion raises a serious question as to whether the Court's
underlying view of work preservation as a flexible, fairly broad, doctrine will
be put into effect. In addition, the Court's concern for the relationship of two
types of work focuses on an issue which may or may not prove that the union
had an objective outside its immediate employer-employee relationship. Yet it
is that determination of the union's objective which indicates that a union
agreement or action is primary, and therefore legal under sections 8(e) or
8(b)(4)(B).
A superior alternative to the test adopted by the Court in International
Longshoremen is the touchstone definition of primary. Under that test, a union's
agreements or actions are legal under sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B) if the union's
sole objective therein relates to its immediate employer, rather than some third
party. This test finds strong support in National Woodwork Manufacturers Associa-
tion v. NLRB, it can be applied practically, and its relations to the primary-
secondary distinction in sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) is clear. Furthermore, the
Court's concern for finding some relationship between the union's objective
and its traditional work can be incorporated into the proposed test, but in a role
properly inferior to the primary-secondary issue of determining whether the
union has an objective outside the employer-employee relationship.
THOMAS L. BARRETTE, j R.
272 See text and notes at notes 31-37 supra for a discussion of the primary-secondary
distinction in $$ 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e).
